Great-Power Cooperation under Conditions of Limited Reciprocity: From Empirical to Formal Analysis

1995/12/01 by Joshua S. Goldstein
Social Sciences · Decision Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Game Theory and Applications #Culture, Economy, and Development Studies

paper · doi:10.2307/2600802

Abstract

Journal Article Great-Power Cooperation Under Conditions of Limited Reciprocity: From Empirical to Formal Analysis Get access Joshua S. Goldstein Joshua S. Goldstein The American University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 4, December 1995, Pages 453–477, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600802 Published: 01 December 1995

Citations

• Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma
• Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism
• Reciprocity in international relations

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