Win-Win Deescalation
2024/09/14 by John N L Koo, Kai Quek
Social Sciences · #Political Conflict and Governance #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #International Relations and Foreign Policy
paper · doi:10.1093/isq/sqae148
Abstract
Abstract Two states are stuck in a conflict because backing down is costly to their leaders. What can they do to exit the conflict peacefully? We propose a novel mechanism that is practically significant but not yet theorized and tested in international relations: win-win deescalation. One side “wins” because the other backs down, but the other also “wins” because it successfully frames its action to its public as a win. How effective are win frames? How would the public react to their leader’s—and the opponent’s—win frames? Using an original experiment in the midst of an ongoing US–China trade war, we identify win frames that can induce the perception of winning and reduce the public costs of deescalation for the Chinese government. The catch, however, is that when America uses the same win frames, it can compromise the Chinese government’s effort to deescalate the conflict, even when it is America backing down. Our work sheds light on the role of win frames in international conflict and how, in the eyes of domestic audiences, backing down is not necessarily losing—nor is the other backing down necessarily you winning.
Citations
- Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism
- When Backing Down Is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs
- National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China
- Audience Costs among the British Public: The Impact of Escalation, Crisis Type, and Prime Ministerial Rhetoric
- Reality Asserts Itself: Public Opinion on Iraq and the Elasticity of Reality
- An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy
- Honest Threats
- Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
- Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve
- Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing
- Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach
- Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict
- Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions
- Authoritarian Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace
- Making It Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals in Extended Deterrence
- Historical Ownership and Territorial Disputes
- Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China
- Relative Gains in the Shadow of a Trade War
- Provocation, Public Opinion, and International Disputes: Evidence from China
- Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Chinese Public Support for War
Related