2015/01/05 by Abel Escribà-Folch, Abel Escribà‐Folch, Covadonga Meseguer +1 · 171 citations
Social Sciences · #Argument (complex analysis) #Autocracy #Democracy #Democratization #Development economics #Dictatorship #Economics #International Development and Aid #Law #Macroeconomics #Migration and Labor Dynamics #Monetary economics #Political Conflict and Governance #Political science #Politics #Revenue #State (computer science) #Tax revenue
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/isqu.12180
published in International Studies Quarterly 59(3), 571-586 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2015/01/05 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/06
Do remittances stabilize autocracies? Remittances—money sent by foreign workers to individuals in their home country—differ from other sources of external non-tax revenue, such as foreign aid, because they accrue directly to individuals and thus raise the incomes of households. We argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party-based regimes. Remittances therefore make voters less dependent on state transfers. As a result, autocracies that rely heavily on the broad-based distribution of spoils for their survival, namely party-based regimes, should prove especially vulnerable to increases in remittances. Evidence consistent with this argument suggests that remittances promote democratization in some dictatorships.