Equilibria of Polymatrix Games

1972/01/01 by Joseph T. Howson · 122 citations
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Computer science #Economics #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Mathematical economics #Optimization and Variational Analysis

paper · doi:10.1287/mnsc.18.5.312

published in Management Science 18(5-part-1), 312-318 (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences)

openalex publication_date 1972/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29

Abstract

A constructive existence proof is given for equilibria of polymatrix games. The construction is based on a generalization of the almost-complementary paths used for the linear complementarity problem.

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