1996/03/11 by Dominic Mayers, Mayers, Dominic · 8 citations
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum Physics (quant-ph) #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9603015
12 pages in revtex (preprint). This revised version contains one minor algebraic modification
openalex publication_date 1996/03/11 · arxiv created 1996/08/04 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In a recent paper, Lo and Chau explain how to break a family of quantum bit commitment schemes, and they claim that their attack applies to the 1993 protocol of Brassard, Crépeau, Jozsa and Langlois (BCJL). The intuition behind their attack is correct, and indeed they expose a weakness common to all proposals of a certain kind, but the BCJL protocol does not fall in this category. Nevertheless, it is true that the BCJL protocol is insecure, but the required attack and proof are more subtle. Here we provide the first complete proof that the BCJL protocol is insecure.