Security Against Impersonation Attacks in Distributed Systems

2017/11/02 by Brown, Philip N., Borowski, Holly, Marden, Jason R. · 1 citation
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Electrical engineering #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1711.00609

Abstract

In a multi-agent system, transitioning from a centralized to a distributed decision-making strategy can introduce vulnerability to adversarial manipulation. We study the potential for adversarial manipulation in a class of graphical coordination games where the adversary can pose as a friendly agent in the game, thereby influencing the decision-making rules of a subset of agents. The adversary's influence can cascade throughout the system, indirectly influencing other agents' behavior and significantly impacting the emergent collective behavior. The main results in this paper focus on characterizing conditions under which the adversary's local influence can dramatically impact the emergent global behavior, e.g., destabilize efficient Nash equilibria.

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