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Implementation without commitment in moral hazard environments

2013/03/05 by Bruno Salcedo, Salcedo, Bruno · 1 citation
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Economic theories and models #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications #cs.GT

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1303.0916

arxiv created 2013/09/16 · arxiv updated 2013/09/18

Abstract

Interdependent-choice equilibrium is defined as an extension of correlated equilibrium in which the mediator is able to choose the timing of her signals, and observe the actions taken by the players. The set of interdependent-choice equilibria is a nonempty, closed and convex polytope. It characterizes all the outcomes that can be implemented in single shot interactions without repetition, side payments, binding contracts or any other form of delegation.

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