2001/09/06 by Federico Mini, Mini, Federico
Business, Management and Accounting · Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Engineering · #Computers and Society (cs.CY) #Digital Platforms and Economics #FOS: Computer and information sciences #ICT Impact and Policies #K.4.m Miscellaneous #Merger and Competition Analysis #cs.CY
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.cs/0109008
29th TPRC Conference, 2001
arxiv created 2001/09/06 · openalex publication_date 2001/09/06 · arxiv updated 2009/11/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
While the 1996 Telecommunications Act requires all incumbent local telephone companies to cooperate with local entrants, section 271 of the Act provides the Bell companies (but not GTE) additional incentives to cooperate. Using an original data set, I compare the negotiations of AT&T, as a local entrant, with GTE and with the Bell companies in states where both operate. My results suggest that the differential incentives matter: The Bells accommodate entry more than does GTE, as evidenced in quicker agreements, less litigation, and more favorable prices offered for network access. Consistent with this, there is more entry into Bell territories