2012/03/02 by Aaron Roth, Roth, Aaron, Grant Schoenebeck +1 · 1 citation
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Data Structures and Algorithms (cs.DS) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing #Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1203.0353
openalex publication_date 2012/03/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We consider the problem of conducting a survey with the goal of obtaining an unbiased estimator of some population statistic when individuals have unknown costs (drawn from a known prior) for participating in the survey. Individuals must be compensated for their participation and are strategic agents, and so the payment scheme must incentivize truthful behavior. We derive optimal truthful mechanisms for this problem for the two goals of minimizing the variance of the estimator given a fixed budget, and minimizing the expected cost of the survey given a fixed variance goal.