2020/12/01 by Sıla Ada, Ada, Sıla, Nadia Abou Nabout +3
Business, Management and Accounting · Decision Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #Digital Platforms and Economics #FOS: Economics and business #General Economics (econ.GN)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.00840
openalex publication_date 2020/12/01 · openalex created_date 2020/12/07 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Ad exchanges, i.e., platforms where real-time auctions for ad impressions take place, have developed sophisticated technology and data ecosystems to allow advertisers to target users, yet advertisers may not know which sites their ads appear on, i.e., the ad context. In practice, ad exchanges can require publishers to provide accurate ad placement information to ad buyers prior to submitting their bids, allowing them to adjust their bids for ads at specific domains, subdomains or URLs. However, ad exchanges have historically been reluctant to disclose placement information due to fears that buyers will start buying ads only on the most desirable sites leaving inventory on other sites unsold and lowering average revenue. This paper explores the empirical effect of ad placement disclosure using a unique data set describing a change in context information provided by a major private European ad exchange. Analyzing this as a quasi-experiment using diff-in-diff, we find that average revenue per impression rose when more context information was provided. This shows that ad context information is important to ad buyers and that providing more context information will not lead to deconflation. The exception to this are sites which had a low number of buyers prior to the policy change; consistent with theory, these sites with thin markets do not show a rise in prices. Our analysis adds evidence that ad exchanges with reputable publishers, particularly smaller volume, high quality sites, should provide ad buyers with site placement information, which can be done at almost no cost.