Persistence probability of a random polynomial arising from evolutionary\n game theory

2018/04/16 by Van Hao Can, Manh Hong Duong, Can, Van Hao +2
Medicine · Social Sciences · #Analysis of PDEs (math.AP) #Dynamical Systems (math.DS) #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #FOS: Biological sciences #FOS: Mathematics #FOS: Physical sciences #Mathematical Physics (math-ph) #Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models #Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE) #Probability (math.PR)

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1804.05908

openalex publication_date 2018/04/16 · openalex created_date 2022/10/02 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

In this paper, we obtain an asymptotic formula for the persistence\nprobability in the positive real line of a random polynomial arising from\nevolutionary game theory. It corresponds to the probability that a multi-player\ntwo-strategy random evolutionary game has no internal equilibria. The key\ningredient is to approximate the sequence of random polynomials indexed by\ntheir degrees by an appropriate centered stationary Gaussian process.\n

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