2015/07/25 by Andrés Abeliuk, Abeliuk, Andres, Gerardo Berbeglia +3
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1507.07152
openalex publication_date 2015/07/25 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without payments and the social cost of any ex-post efficient mechanism, can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible mechanism for one-way games that is budget-balanced, individually rational, and efficient. To address this negative result, we propose a privacy-preserving mechanism that is incentive-compatible and budget-balanced, satisfies ex-post individual rationality conditions, and produces an outcome which is more efficient than the equilibrium without payments. The mechanism is based on a single-offer bargaining and we show that a randomized multi-offer extension brings no additional benefit.