2016/01/26 by Mathieu Dahan, Saurabh Amin, Dahan, Mathieu +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Engineering · #05C21 #91A10 #91A43 #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Electrical engineering #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis #Primary: 91A05 #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering #secondary: 90C46
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1601.07216
openalex publication_date 2016/01/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
This article considers a two-player strategic game for network routing under link disruptions. Player 1 (defender) routes flow through a network to maximize her value of effective flow while facing transportation costs. Player 2 (attacker) simultaneously disrupts one or more links to maximize her value of lost flow but also faces cost of disrupting links. Linear programming duality in zero-sum games and the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem are applied to obtain properties that are satisfied in any Nash equilibrium. A characterization of the support of the equilibrium strategies is provided using graph-theoretic arguments. Finally, conditions under which these results extend to budget-constrained environments are also studied. These results extend the classical minimum cost maximum flow problem and the minimum cut problem to a class of security games on flow networks.