2018/04/23 by Roseanne W. McManus · 104 citations
Psychology · Social Sciences · #Deterrence (psychology) #Deterrence theory #Focus (optics) #International Relations and Foreign Policy #Law #Political Conflict and Governance #Political science #Power (physics) #Psychology #Public relations #Social psychology #Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
paper · doi:10.1086/697462
published in The Journal of Politics 80(3), 982-995 (University of Chicago Press)
openalex publication_date 2018/04/23 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
This article explores how a major power’s leader can deter challenges against weaker states using “leader-specific” signals of support. These signals are sent by a leader personally and publicly, so that the leader becomes associated with the signal in the eyes of the public. Leader-specific signals can be a valuable tool for achieving credible extended deterrence because they are flexible, and they create personal audience and reputational costs for leaders. I focus on leader visits abroad as the type of leader-specific signal that is most likely to be credible. I use original data recording leadership visits in a statistical analysis of extended deterrence success 1950–2007 and find that these visits have a significant deterrent effect. This is particularly true when a visit is accompanied by a high level of supportive statements and when the visit recipient also has a major power defense pact.