2006/07/06 by John M. Carey, John Polga-Hecimovich, John Polga–Hecimovich · 134 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Psychology · Social Sciences · #Competition (biology) #Democracy #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #General election #Latin Americans #Law #Openness to experience #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Politics and Society in Latin America #Presidential system #Primary election #Psychology #Public administration #Social psychology #Test (biology)
paper · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00443.x
published in The Journal of Politics 68(3), 530-543 (University of Chicago Press)
openalex publication_date 2006/07/06 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22
Political parties throughout Latin America rely increasingly on primary elections to select candidates for public office. Where they are adopted, primaries are generally touted as moves toward openness and internal party democracy. Yet politicians and party leaders are concerned with winning elections, and there are reasons to expect that primaries select candidates who are weaker in general election competition than other methods. Using data from every democratic presidential election in Latin America since the late 1970s, we test whether primaries systematically affect candidate strength. We find evidence of a primary bonus—that is, other things equal, primary-selected candidates are stronger than those selected by other procedures.