2021/11/08 by Shubhadeep Sadhukhan, Sadhukhan, Shubhadeep, Ashutosh Shukla +3
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems (nlin.AO) #Biological Physics (physics.bio-ph) #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Biological sciences #FOS: Physical sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2111.04293
openalex publication_date 2021/11/08 · openalex created_date 2022/05/05 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
A completely non-generous and reciprocal population of players can create a robust cooperating state that cannot be invaded by always defecting free riders if the interactions among players are repeated for long enough. However, strict non-generosity and strict reciprocity are ideal concepts, and may not even be desirable sometimes. Therefore, to what extent generosity or non-reciprocity can be allowed while still not be swamped by the mutants, is a natural question. In this paper, we not only ask this question but furthermore ask how generosity comparatively fares against non-reciprocity in this context. For mathematical concreteness, we work within the framework of multiplayer repeated prisoner's dilemma game with reactive strategies in a finite and an infinite population; and explore the aforementioned questions through the effects of the benefit to cost ratio, the interaction group size, and the population size.