2026/01/01 by Robbie Kubala, Harvey Lederman, Adam Lovett
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Innovation, Sustainability, Human-Machine Systems
paper · doi:10.5840/jphil2026123322
Bradford (2023) calls attention to the fact that the strength of our reasons to preserve distinctively valuable objects increases as the number of such objects decreases. Bradford develops an account of this phenomenon in terms of ‘irreplaceable value’, and in particular in terms of a notion of the degree of such value, which is distinct from its amount. We present an alternative explanation of this pattern in our reasons, which appeals to the value of diversity: the world is better, other things equal, insofar as it contains more kinds of value. We develop this view in two connected ways: one appeals to evidential probability under conditions of uncertainty, and the other appeals to the value of diversity. We conclude by discussing some explanatory advantages of our view over Bradford’s.