2025/11/19 by Su, Pengcheng, Cheng, Haibo, Wang, Ping
#Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Information Theory (cs.IT)
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2511.15051
The shuffle model enhances privacy by anonymizing users' reports through random permutation. This paper presents the first systematic study of the single-message shuffle model from an information-theoretic perspective. We analyze two regimes: the shuffle-only setting, where each user directly submits its message (Yi=Xi), and the shuffle-DP setting, where each user first applies a local ε0-differentially private mechanism before shuffling (Yi=R(Xi)). Let \boldsymbolZ = (Yσ(i))i denote the shuffled sequence produced by a uniformly random permutation σ, and let K = σ-1(1) represent the position of user 1's message after shuffling. For the shuffle-only setting, we focus on a tractable yet expressive basic configuration, where the target user's message follows Y1 ∼ P and the remaining users' messages are i.i.d. samples from Q, i.e., Y2,…,Yn ∼ Q. We derive asymptotic expressions for the mutual information quantities I(Y1;\boldsymbolZ) and I(K;\boldsymbolZ) as n → ∞, and demonstrate how this analytical framework naturally extends to settings with heterogeneous user distributions. For the shuffle-DP setting, we establish information-theoretic upper bounds on total information leakage. When each user applies an ε0-DP mechanism, the overall leakage satisfies I(K; \boldsymbolZ) ≤ 2ε0 and I(X1; \boldsymbolZ| (Xi)i=2n) ≤ (eε0-1)/(2n) + O(n-3/2). These results bridge shuffle differential privacy and mutual-information-based privacy.