2023/01/17 by Farzad Pourbabaee, Pourbabaee, Farzad, Federico Echenique +1 · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2301.06967
openalex publication_date 2023/01/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences. The setting is a standard binary model with transfers and quasi-linear utility. Agents report their preferences for the public good, which are randomly ``flipped,'' so that any individual report may be explained away as the outcome of noise. We study the tradeoffs between preserving the public decisions made in the presence of noise (noise sensitivity), pursuing efficiency, and mitigating the effect of noise on revenue.