2021/11/12 by Gian Caspari, Caspari, Gian, Manshu Khanna +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2111.06815
openalex publication_date 2021/11/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.