Individual Rationality Conditions of Identifying Matching Costs in Transferable Utility Matching Games

2022/04/01 by Suguru Otani, Otani, Suguru
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #General Economics (econ.GN)

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2204.00713

openalex publication_date 2022/04/01 · openalex created_date 2022/04/26 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

As the widely applied method for measuring matching assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game, a matching maximum score estimation is proposed by \citefox2010qe. This article reveals that combining unmatched agents, transfers, and individual rationality conditions with sufficiently large penalty terms makes it possible to identify the coefficient parameter of a single common constant, i.e., matching costs in the market.

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