2001/11/01 by Yener Altunbas, Yener Altunbaş, Lynne Evans +1 · 631 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Agency cost #Banking stability, regulation, efficiency #Business #Competitor analysis #Corporate Finance and Governance #Corporate governance #Economics #Emerging markets #Finance #Financial system #German #Housing Market and Economics #Industrial organization #Inefficiency #Market economy #Marketing #Microeconomics #Private sector #Profit (economics) #Public ownership #State ownership #Variety (cybernetics)
paper · doi:10.2307/2673929
published in Journal of money credit and banking 33(4), 926 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 2001/11/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/17
Agency issues associated with different types of firm ownership are an area of concern in many banking systems where state-owned banks operate alongside mutual and private-sector institutions. This paper uses a variety of approaches to model cost and profit inefficiencies as well as technical change for different ownership types in the German banking market. We find little evidence to suggest that privately owned banks are more efficient than their mutual and public-sector counterparts. While all three bank ownership types benefit from widespread economies of scale, inefficiency measures indicate that public and mutual banks have slight cost and profit advantages over their private sector competitors.