Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence

1993/05/01 by Alberto Alesina, Lawrence H. Summers · 1,828 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Central bank #Control variable #Economics #Ex-ante #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Global Financial Crisis and Policies #Independence (probability theory) #Inflation (cosmology) #Inflation targeting #Macroeconomics #Monetary Policy and Economic Impact #Monetary economics #Monetary policy #Political science #Politics #Sample (material) #Unemployment #Work (physics)

paper · doi:10.2307/2077833

published in Journal of money credit and banking 25(2), 151 (Wiley)

openalex publication_date 1993/05/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/26

Abstract

This note uses information on a sample of sixteen OECD countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance. As previous work suggests, politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation. However, the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth, unemployment, or the ex ante real interest rate. Copyright 1993 by Ohio State University Press.

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