1974/12/01 by M. T. Ghiselin · 885 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · Arts and Humanities · #Economic Theory and Institutions #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Philosophy and History of Science #Analogy #Biology #Organism #Problem of universals #Taxon #Synonym (taxonomy) #Evolutionary biology #Ecology #Competition (biology) #Epistemology #Zoology #Genus #Philosophy
paper · open access · doi:10.1093/sysbio/23.4.536
published in Systematic Biology 23(4), 536-544 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 1974/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/08
Traditionally, species (like other taxa) have been treated as classes (universals). In fact they may be considered individuals (particular things). The logical term “individual” has been confused with a biological synonym for “organism.” If species are individuals, then: 1) their names are proper, 2) there cannot be instances of them, 3) they do not have defining properties (intensions), 4) their constituent organisms are parts, not members. “Species” may be defined as the most extensive units in the natural economy such that reproductive competition occurs among their parts. Species are to evolutionary theory as firms are to economic theory: this analogy resolves many issues, such as the problems of “reality” and the ontological status of nomenclatorial types.