2025/04/10 by A.P. Simester, Findlay Stark · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Computer science #Conflict of Laws and Jurisdiction #Criminal Law and Evidence #Legal principles and applications
paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/s0008197325000078
published in The Cambridge Law Journal 84(2), 345-367 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 2025/04/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
Abstract In R. v Jogee; Ruddock v The Queen , the Supreme Court abolished “joint enterprise liability”, thus removing the need for a doctrine that used to temper the harshness of joint enterprise: the “fundamental difference” rule. The Supreme Court nevertheless allowed this rule to linger on in the form of an “overwhelming supervening act” doctrine. That doctrine has led to the creation of yet another: an “escalation” doctrine. We argue that there is no place in the post-Jogee law of complicity for doctrines based on fundamental difference, overwhelming supervening acts or escalation. This is no mere semantic quibble. It has significant implications for the way in which complicity law should be applied, especially in homicide cases.