2026/07/27 by Brian Cheffins, Brian R. Cheffins, Bobby Reddy +1
Business, Management and Accounting · #Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance #Code (set theory) #Core (optical fiber) #Corporate Law and Human Rights #Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting #Corporate governance #Element (criminal law) #Shareholder #Stewardship (theology)
paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/s0008197326101597
published in The Cambridge Law Journal, 1-30 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 2026/07/27 · openalex created_date 2026/07/28 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Abstract Since the Financial Reporting Council (“FRC”) issued the initial version of the Stewardship Code in 2010, fostering shareholder engagement in publicly traded companies has been a core element of the Code. When the FRC promulgated the 2020 Stewardship Code the FRC was responding to evidence that prior versions had fallen short on the shareholder activism front by emphasising disclosure of engagement outcomes by Code signatories. This article indicates that the 2026 Stewardship Code reverts substantially to the ineffective pre-2020 approach, explains why the change occurred, and argues that this is the end of the road with respect to shareholder engagement and the Stewardship Code.