2025/08/24 by Agata Machcewicz-Grad · 2 voices
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Narrative Theory and Analysis #Language, Metaphor, and Cognition
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/09515089.2025.2551239
In this paper, I discuss a hybrid view of beliefs developed by Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas, which combines a fictionalist treatment of standing beliefs with a realist account of occurrent judgments. The view is promising: on the one hand, it offers a pragmatic solution to the puzzle of non-integrated subjects and, on the other, it provides a realistic account of conscious mental phenomena. However, it faces challenges due to its hybridity. First, I argue that detaching judgment from belief makes it difficult to account for the dynamics of deliberation. I also point out the inconsistency between the hybrid view and our subjective understanding of the nature of conscious judgment. I contend that realism about both occurrent mental acts and standing mental states is a more plausible account of the mind. Secondly, I claim that if one accepts the thesis of privileged access to one’s conscious mind, then one should develop a realist explanation of the puzzle of non-integrated agents, rather than a pragmatic analysis defended by Crane and Farkas. In conclusion, I argue that the hybrid account of standing and occurrent mental phenomena does not provide a plausible alternative to the globally realist and globally pragmatist accounts of belief.