1987/12/01 by Jim Stone · 148 citations
Health Professions · Medicine · Social Sciences · #Animal life #Appeal #Biology #Creatures #Environmental ethics #Epistemology #Ethics and Legal Issues in Pediatric Healthcare #Ethics in medical practice #Fetus #Law #Natural (archaeology) #Nothing #Philosophy #Political Philosophy and Ethics #Political science #Pregnancy #Virtue #Zoology
paper · doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920
published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17(4), 815-829 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 1987/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
Do fetuses have a right to life in virtue of the fact that they are potential adult human beings? I take the claim that the fetus is a potential adult human being to come to this: if the fetus grows normally there will be an adult human animal that was once the fetus. Does this fact ground a claim to our care and protection? A great deal hangs on the answer to this question. The actual mental and physical capacities of a human fetus are inferior to those of adult creatures generally thought to lack a serious right to life (e.g., adult chickens), and the mere fact that a fetus belongs to our species in particular seems morally irrelevant. Consequently, a strong fetal claim to protection rises or falls with the appeal to the fetus's potentiality, for nothing else can justify it.