2026/08/07 by Yiyuan (Ian) Sun
paper · doi:10.1111/jbfa.70080
published in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting (Wiley)
ABSTRACT This paper examines firms' voluntary disclosure of subsidy information under socio‐political scrutiny. In 2015, China enforced a regulation to crack down on “zombie firms” relying heavily on government subsidies to survive, which aroused widespread socio‐political scrutiny of the provision of subsidies. Using a difference‐in‐differences analysis, I find that the zombie firms significantly reduce their voluntary disclosure of subsidies received after the regulatory shock. Cross‐sectional analyses show that the effect is stronger for firms receiving more public attention, firms whose performance is more vulnerable to subsidies, and politically connected firms. Overall, these findings suggest that subsidy recipients tend to adopt a more conservative disclosure strategy on subsidy information to mitigate the impact of socio‐political scrutiny.