2026/08/05 by Furkan Sezer
Physics and Astronomy · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #quant-ph #econ.TH #math.OC #msc:81P45 #msc:91A27 #msc:91A80 #msc:90C22 #msc:94A15
24 pages, 1 figure
arxiv created 2026/08/05 · arxiv updated 2026/08/06
Bergemann and Morris (2016) show that one information structure is more informative than another exactly when it induces a smaller set of Bayes correlated equilibrium outcomes in every game. We build the quantum analogue. An information structure becomes a family of density operators indexed by the payoff state, which the mediator observes. We show that obedience is equivalent to a Loewner domination between operators on one player's subsystem. The equilibrium set is then a nonempty compact spectrahedron computable by semidefinite programming, classical structures embed exactly, and under quantum individual sufficiency more information shrinks the equilibrium set in every game.