2020/01/05 by James A. Smith, Kenneth R. Hamm, Kauser Imtiaz +1 · 1 citation
Engineering · #Spacecraft Design and Technology #Space Exploration and Technology #Rocket and propulsion systems research #Crew #Schedule #Shield #Finite element method #Structural engineering #Architecture #Computer science #Fire performance #Engineering #Mechanical engineering #Aeronautics #Geology
paper · doi:10.2514/6.2020-0246
openalex publication_date 2020/01/05 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
This paper highlights four space flight assessments, each with an important lesson. The first assessment points to the challenge of material substitution for weight saving. Space Shuttle’s external tank stringers were changed from Al 2024 to Al 2090 without comprehensive analysis. Lack of understanding the low Short-Transverse (S-T) strength associated with Al 2090 led to widespread cracking. The second assessment addresses the failure to understand that time-dependent relationships and loading interactions of multiple disciplines can lead to non-conservative results. An aerodynamic test article of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Launch Abort System (LAS) was analyzed for worst-case single discipline loads, showing positive structural margins. When disciplines were combined with time dependent loading, the analysis resulted in negative margins. The third assessment highlights the pitfalls of putting blind trust in historical architecture. The MPCV re-entry heat shield adopted the Apollo design approach despite fundamental differences between the two designs (e.g., the underlying substructure design, material differences, scale, and geometry). Manufacturing resulted in cracking along seams of the cured MPCV heat shield and produced lower mechanical properties of the Avcoat witness panels. Subsequently, the design was changed to a block architecture, which introduced unperceived technical, cost, and schedule risk. The fourth assessment shows how the lack of a comprehensive investigation of design modifications and inappropriate Finite Element Analyses (FEA) can lead to trouble. A mass reduction campaign eliminated highly critical internal struts on the International Space Station (ISS) Node-1 pressurized module based on inadequate and uncorrelated FEA. High strains were noted and ignored as a modeling aberration. A system-level high-fidelity FEA discovered large plastic strains in the gussets of all four radial ports. These findings initiated a full-scale test campaign, new test correlated assembly-level FEA, and significant design modifications.