2020/08/12 by Laine P. Shay · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Legislature #Lawmaking #Delegation #Term (time) #Limit (mathematics) #Political science #Power (physics) #State (computer science) #Law and economics #Economics #Law #Computer science #Mathematics
paper · doi:10.1177/1532440020947643
openalex publication_date 2020/08/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
Abstract What is the role of legislative term limits in the structure of legislative institutions? Using Mooney’s collective action problem theoretical framework on legislative leadership power, I claim that legislative term limits should be a key determinant in a state Speaker’s power via the delegation of institutional tools that control the lawmaking process. Speakers can use these tools to influence policy outcomes and their colleagues. I test this expectation in an analysis of lower chamber rules in nearly all states between 1981 and 2015. The results indicate that states with implemented term limits are associated with a more powerful Speaker. These findings suggest that a more nuanced relationship between legislative term limits and leadership power exist than previously thought.