1969/06/01 by Frederic Schick · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Psychology · Computer Science · Mathematics · #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Arrow #Transitive relation #Arrow's impossibility theorem #Impossibility #Preference #Mathematical economics #Epistemology #Arrow of time #Mathematics #Philosophy #Social choice theory #Computer science #Law #Combinatorics
paper · doi:10.1086/288241
openalex publication_date 1969/06/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/07
This paper is a critique of Kenneth Arrow's thesis concerning the logical impossibility of a constitution. I argue that one of the premises of Arrow's proof, that of the transitivity of indifference, is untenable. Several concepts of preference are introduced and counter-instances are offered to the transitivity of indifference defined along the standard lines in terms of these concepts. Alternate analyses of indifference in terms of preference are considered, and it is shown that these do not serve Arrow's purposes either. Finally, it is argued that in the single special case in which indifference could plausibly be held to be transitive, Arrow's thesis is innocuous.