2026/06/23 by Lukas Brunninger, Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Klaus Gugler +1
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Energy · #Brake #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #Economics of Agriculture and Food Markets #Empirical evidence #Empirical research #Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies #Gas industry
paper · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103309
published in International Journal of Industrial Organization 107, 103309 (Elsevier BV)
openalex publication_date 2026/06/23 · crossref created 2026/06/23 · openalex created_date 2026/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/01 · crossref issued 2026/08/01 · crossref published 2026/08/01 · crossref published-print 2026/08/01 · crossref deposited 2026/08/05 · crossref indexed 2026/08/05
In the aftermath of the Russian invasion in Ukraine and rising gas prices, the ’gas price brake’, a subsidy scheme for retail consumers and firms, was implemented in Germany. We employ a difference-in-differences approach and analyze data on offered gas contracts from two countries with comparable gas markets, where one country (Germany) has implemented the gas price brake and the other (Austria) has not. We find that the gas price brake led to an increase in total annual gas costs in Germany. This increase is entirely attributable to incumbents increasing counterfactual gas prices by up to 90%. Non-incumbents do not ’milk‘ the brake.