Calculated Indifference: The Soviet Union and Requests to Bomb Auschwitz

2013/04/01 by Danny Orbach, M. Solonin · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · Psychology · #German History and Society #European history and politics #Memory, Trauma, and Commemoration #Soviet union #Preparedness #Political science #Law #Antisemitism #Economic history #History #Archaeology #Politics #Judaism

paper · doi:10.1093/hgs/dct002

openalex publication_date 2013/04/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/04/05

Abstract

In the ongoing debate about whether the Allies should have bombed the Auschwitz extermination camp, the Soviet Union is rarely mentioned. Focusing on four operational challenges—accuracy, range, time, and intelligence—the authors compare British, American, and Soviet preparedness for such a mission. In addition, on the basis of little-used documentary evidence, they argue that Stalin's refusal to bomb Auschwitz must be attributed not only to his antisemitism, but also to a complicated shift in the Soviet Union's nationalities policy.

Citations

• An American Operational Response to a Request to Bomb Rail Lines to Auschwitz
• Could the Allies Have Bombed Auschwitz-Birkenau?

Cited by

• Auschwitz bombing debate [wikipedia]

Related

• An American Operational Response to a Request to Bomb Rail Lines to Auschwitz
• Allied Knowledge of Auschwitz: A (Further) Challenge to the "Elusiveness" Narrative
• "Total Annihilation of the Jewish Population": The Holocaust in the Soviet Media, 1941-45
• Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part I
• Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II