1984/01/01 by Bryan G. Norton · 540 citations
Environmental Science · #Anthropocentrism #Applied philosophy #Climate Change and Geoengineering #Contemporary philosophy #Environmental Philosophy and Ethics #Environmental ethics #Epistemology #General interest #Philosophy
paper · doi:10.5840/enviroethics19846233
published in Environmental Ethics 6(2), 131-148 (Philosophy Documentation Center)
crossref issued 1984/01/01 · crossref published 1984/01/01 · crossref published-online 1984/01/01 · openalex publication_date 1984/01/01 · crossref created 2012/10/05 · crossref deposited 2020/05/19 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · crossref indexed 2026/07/30 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
This chapter suggests that the distinction between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism has been given more importance in discussions of the foundations of environmental ethics than it warrants because a crucial ambiguity in the term anthropocentrism has gone unnoticed. There are two forms of anthropocentrism, weak and strong, and weak anthropocentrism is adequate to support an environmental ethic. Environmental ethics is, however, distinctive vis-a-vis standard British and American ethical systems because, in order to be adequate, it must be nonindividualistic. Weak anthropocentrism provides a basis for criticizing individual, consumptive needs and can provide the basis for adjudicating between these levels, thereby providing an adequate basis for environmental ethics without the questionable ontological commitments made by nonanthropocentrists in attributing intrinsic value to nature. Anthropocentrists are therefore taken to believe that every instance of value originates in a contribution to human values and that all elements of nature can, at most, have value instrumental to the satisfaction of human interests.