2020/06/19 by Zhu Cao
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Algorithm #BB84 #Computer science #Computer security #Cryptography #Encryption #Key (lock) #Key distribution #Measurement device #Physics #Protocol (science) #Public-key cryptography #Quantum #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum cryptography #Quantum information #Quantum key distribution #Quantum mechanics #Theoretical computer science #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physreva.101.062325
published as Physical Review A 101, 062325 (2020) · 8 pages, 3 figures
openalex publication_date 2020/06/19 · arxiv created 2020/06/22 · arxiv updated 2020/06/23 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution removes all detector-side attacks in quantum cryptography, and in the meantime doubles the secure distance. The source side, however, is still vulnerable to various attacks. In particular, the continuous phase randomization assumption on the source side is normally not fulfilled in experimental implementation and may potentially open a loophole. In this work, we first show that indeed there are loopholes for imperfect phase randomization in measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution by providing a concrete attack. Then we propose a discrete-phase-randomized measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol as a solution to close this source-side loophole.