Evolutionary Dynamics with Randomly Distributed Benevolent Individuals

2023/12/30 by Yuxin Geng, Xingru Chen, Geng, Yuxin +1
Social Sciences · Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Physics and Astronomy · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2401.00214

Abstract

Understanding the evolution of cooperation is pivotal in biology and social science. Public resources sharing is a common scenario in the real world. In our study, we explore the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on a regular graph with degree k, introducing the presence of a third strategy, namely the benevolence, who does not evolve over time, but provides a fixed benefit to all its neighbors. We find that the presence of the benevolence can foster the development of cooperative behavior and it follows a simple rule: b/c > k - p_S(k-1). Our results provide new insights into the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.

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