The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)

2019/03/13 by Debin Ma, Jared Rubin
Social Sciences · #China #Commit #Confiscation #Culture, Economy, and Development Studies #Economics #Finance #Investment (military) #Law #Law and economics #Local Government Finance and Decentralization #Political science #Politics #Power (physics) #Principal (computer security) #Public economics #Revenue #Tax revenue

paper · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2019.03.002

openalex publication_date 2019/03/13 · crossref created 2019/03/13 · crossref issued 2019/06/01 · crossref published 2019/06/01 · crossref published-print 2019/06/01 · crossref deposited 2025/09/27 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · crossref indexed 2026/08/04 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/06

Citations

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• Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
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• State Capacity, Conflict and Development
• The clan and the corporation: Sustaining cooperation in China and Europe