Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments

1990/06/01 by Anup Agrawal, Gershon N. Mandelker, Gershon Mandelker · 583 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Accounting #Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance #Business #Charter #Corporate Finance and Governance #Corporate governance #Finance #Financial Markets and Investment Strategies #Law #Political science #Shareholder

paper · doi:10.2307/2330821

published in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 25(2), 143 (Cambridge University Press)

openalex publication_date 1990/06/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Anup Agrawal, Gershon N. Mandelker, Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 143-161

Citations

• Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

Cited by

• Trust, business group verticality, and firm productivity
• Institutional investor stability and crash risk: Monitoring versus short-termism?
• The sources of value destruction in acquisitions by entrenched managers

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