CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure

2023/09/12 by Ahmed Elnahas, Lei Gao, Md Noman Hossain +2
Business, Management and Accounting · #Corporate Law and Human Rights #Corporate Finance and Governance

paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/s0022109023001023

Abstract

Abstract This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk.

Citations

• Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility
• Corporate Policies of Republican Managers

Related

• Political Ideologies of CEOs
• Does Accounting Conservatism Discipline Qualitative Disclosure? Evidence From Tone Management in the MD&A*
• Corporate Policies of Republican Managers
• On the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management
• Pumping the Brakes: Examining the Impact of CEO Political Ideology Divergence on Firm Responses