2015/09/10 by Róbert Horváth · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Security, Politics, and Digital Transformation #Legal and Policy Issues #Eastern European Communism and Reforms #Repertoire #Opposition (politics) #Ideology #Civil disobedience #Politics #Credibility #Political science #Law #Sociology #Art
paper · doi:10.1111/russ.12049
openalex publication_date 2015/09/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
This article examines the surprising revival of dissident principles and dissident modes of protest in the Russian opposition during the Putin‐Medvedev “tandemocracy” (2008–12). Its focus is “Strategy‐31,” a campaign of civil disobedience instigated by the radical activist Eduard Limonov. The first part of this article seeks to demonstrate how Strategy‐31 employed what Charles Tilly terms a “repertoire of contention,” a set of performed actions and discursive practices, which had been inherited from the dissident rights‐defenders. This repertoire both mimicked and transformed the dissidents” traditional forms of activism. By employing this repertoire and by explicitly identifying dissidents as his precursors, Limonov legitimised Strategy‐31 and made it easier for his political rivals and ideological adversaries to join him in a common endeavor. The second part of this article shows how tensions within the dissident tradition contributed to the breakdown of the coalition of radicals and rights‐defenders at the core of Strategy‐31. To bolster his credibility as a crusader for constitutional rights, Limonov had courted the support of Lyudmila Alekseeva, a veteran dissident who headed the Moscow Helsinki Group. By joining Limonov as an applicant for Strategy‐31, Alekseeva became a living link between its demonstrations and those of its dissident precursors. But Alekseeva and Limonov differed profoundly in their motives and their goals. These differences, which were skilfully exploited by the authorities, ultimately led to the collapse of Strategy‐31.