2016/01/02 by Mahesh Shankar · 5 citations
Social Sciences · Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #South Asian Studies and Conflicts #Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East #Indian History and Philosophy #Blame #Salience (neuroscience) #Political science #Documentation #State (computer science) #Law #Political economy #Sociology #Computer science #Psychology #Social psychology
paper · doi:10.1080/14736489.2016.1129926
published in India Review 15(1), 1-21 (Routledge)
openalex publication_date 2016/01/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2025/11/06
As the dispute over Kashmir broke out in 1947, a plebiscite of the people of the state offered a mutually acceptable and ostensibly fair path out of the imbroglio. Critics have often laid the blame on Nehru, and the territory’s salience to India, for why a plebiscite was never held. Based on primary documentation, this article makes the case that it was not a lack of commitment to the formula, but rather Nehru’s deeply held strategic and reputational fears that motivated, first, the setting of what Delhi saw as firm but fair pre-conditions, and after the conclusion of the US-Pakistan military pact in 1954, the complete rejection of the plebiscite option.