2020/11/26 by Di Wu · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Chinese history and philosophy #Vietnamese History and Culture Studies #Asian Geopolitics and Ethnography #Battle #Yangtze river #Doctrine #Narrative #Resistance (ecology) #Terrain #Geography #History #Cult #China #Political science #Ancient history #Cartography #Law #Archaeology #Philosophy
paper · pdf · doi:10.1177/0968344520961548
openalex publication_date 2020/11/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/22
When Wuhan became the centre of Chinese resistance, the Kuomintang formulated a defensive strategy for the geography of the Central Yangtze. Without a coherent riverine defence doctrine, they were over-confident about the benefits of the terrain, causing a series of catastrophic blunders including the neglect of the intricate connections between ground and waterborne forces, the deployment of subpar troops for the defence of key fortifications, and the mistaken utilization of ‘drowned earth’ tactics. This article challenges existing narratives of the Second Sino-Japanese War and fills a gap in the current understanding of the defensive aspect of riverine warfare.