2016/09/21 by Micah Lott · 9 citations
Neuroscience · Decision Sciences · Psychology · #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Ethics in Business and Education #Free Will and Agency #Consequentialism #Deontological ethics #Argument (complex analysis) #Dual process theory (moral psychology) #Cognition #Epistemology #Dual (grammatical number) #Moral psychology #Sociology #Psychology #Philosophy
paper · open access · doi:10.1086/687337
published in Ethics 127(1), 241-256 (University of Chicago Press)
openalex publication_date 2016/09/21 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Joshua Greene argues that cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics in two ways, the “direct route” and the “indirect route.” Greene illustrates the direct route with a debunking explanation of the inclination to condemn all incest. The indirect route is an updated version of Greene’s argument that dual-process moral psychology gives support for consequentialism over deontology. I consider each of Greene’s arguments, and I argue that neither succeeds. If there is a route from cognitive (neuro)science to ethics, Greene has not found it.