2017/09/30 by Eric Kramon · 109 citations
Social Sciences · #Accountability #African history and culture studies #African studies and sociopolitical issues #Argument (complex analysis) #Clientelism #Credibility #Democracy #Economics #Law #Political Conflict and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Quality (philosophy) #Survey data collection
paper · doi:10.1017/9781108149839
published in Cambridge University Press eBooks (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 2017/09/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/15
Politicians distribute money to voters during campaigns in many low-income democracies. Many observers call this practice 'vote buying'. Money for Votes develops an alternative theory of electoral clientelism that emphasizes the role of monetary handouts in conveying information to voters, helping politicians enhance the credibility of their promises to deliver development resources and particularistic benefits to their constituents. Supported by interviews, experiments, and surveys in Kenya, and additional evidence from qualitative and survey data from elsewhere in Africa, the study tests the implications of this argument, and traces the consequences of electoral clientelism for voter behaviour, ethnic politics, public goods provision, and democratic accountability. Ultimately, the book suggests that the relationship of electoral clientelism to the quality of democracy is far more nuanced than our instincts might suggest