Reputation and imperfect information

1982/08/01 by David M. Kreps, David M Kreps, Robert Wilson · 3,151 citations
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · Social Sciences · #Complete information #Computer science #Dilemma #Economic theories and models #Economics #Epistemology #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications #Game theory #Imperfect #Mathematical economics #Mathematics #Microeconomics #Perfect information #Phenomenon #Repeated game #Reputation #Sociology

paper · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8

published in Journal of Economic Theory 27(2), 253-279 (Elsevier BV)

openalex publication_date 1982/08/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04

Citations

• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence

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