2016/02/29 by Marco Alberto Javarone, Alberto Antonioni, Francesco Caravelli · 3 citations
Physics and Astronomy · Psychology · Social Sciences · #Altruism (biology) #Biology #Computer science #Conformity #Economics #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Evolutionary biology #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Mathematical economics #Microeconomics #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Population #Psychology #Public good #Public goods game #Selfishness #Set (abstract data type) #Social dilemma #Social psychology #Sociology #Stochastic game #Survival of the fittest #nlin.AO #physics.soc-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/114/38001
published as EPL, 114 (2016) 38001 · 13 pages, 5 figures
openalex publication_date 2016/05/01 · arxiv created 2017/08/29 · arxiv updated 2017/08/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/06
We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of fitness-driven and conformity-driven agents. This framework usually considers only the former type of agents, i.e. , agents that tend to imitate the strategy of their fittest neighbors. However, whenever we study social systems, the evolution of a population might be affected also by social behaviors as conformism, stubbornness, altruism, and selfishness. Although the term evolution can assume different meanings depending on the considered domain, here it corresponds to the set of processes that lead a system towards an equilibrium or a steady state. We map fitness to the agents' payoff so that richer agents are those most imitated by fitness-driven agents, while conformity-driven agents tend to imitate the strategy assumed by the majority of their neighbors. Numerical simulations aim to identify the nature of the transition, on varying the amount of the relative density of conformity-driven agents in the population, and to study the nature of related equilibria. Remarkably, we find that conformism generally fosters ordered cooperative phases and may also lead to bistable behaviors.