1992/04/01 by Laurence R. Iannaccone · 1,266 citations
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Psychology · #Religion and Society Interactions #Culture, Economy, and Development Studies #Taxation and Compliance Studies #Sacrifice #Club #Social psychology #Sociology #Politics #Citizen journalism #Stigma (botany) #Free riding #Positive economics #Psychology #Economics #Political science #Law #Microeconomics #Incentive #Theology #Philosophy
paper · doi:10.1086/261818
published in Journal of Political Economy 100(2), 271-291 (University of Chicago Press)
openalex publication_date 1992/04/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
This paper presents an economic analysis of religious behavior that accounts for the continuing success of groups with strange requirements and seemingly inefficient prohibitions. The analysis does not presuppose any special motives for religious activity. Rather, religion is modeled as a club good that displays positive returns to "participatory crowding." The analysis demonstrates that efficient religions with perfectly rational members may benefit from stigma, self-sacrifice, and bizarre behavioral restrictions. The model also addresses sacrifice in nonreligious "social clubs": fraternities, communes, political parties, work groups, and families.