2000/01/01 by Christopher Bell · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Engineering · #Military History and Strategy #Maritime Security and History #Navy #Politics #Position (finance) #Power (physics) #State (computer science) #Political science #Face (sociological concept) #Law #Engineering #Political economy #Business #Finance #Economics #Sociology #Computer science
paper · doi:10.1057/9780230599239_1
openalex publication_date 2000/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2025/11/06
From the late nineteenth century until the eve of the Second World War, Britain’s naval requirements were formally calculated on the basis of officially sanctioned naval ‘standards.’ These standards specified which power, combination of powers, or number of powers Britain should match in naval strength, and normally resulted from a careful balancing of strategic, diplomatic, and financial considerations. Statesmen considered not only the size of navy needed to defend Britain’s vital interests, but also how much the state could afford to spend, and which threats it could realistically expect to face. Insuring against all possible dangers with a massive and sustained naval construction program was prohibitively expensive and would have undermined Britain’s economic strength, thereby weakening its overall strategic position. Moreover, the end result of such a program would have borne little relation to Britain’s genuine security needs. Conversely, failure to provide against real threats would encourage aggressors and leave Britain dangerously exposed if war did occur. Responsible decision-makers agreed that the navy had to be strong enough to provide security against any reasonably probable foe, but also that expensive preparations against too many powers must be avoided.